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Abstract: A brief review of evaluation findings in almost any given domain typically 
reveals that most and sometimes all major findings deal with the implementation 
of initiatives—also known as action theory. Moreover, the findings regarding im-
plementation frequently allude to mismatches between the type or level of imple-
mentation occurring and the fundamental nature of the initiative. Case examples 
will illustrate that while all permutations and combinations of change and action 
theories cannot be summarily assessed, one can use case analysis to draw some les-
sons to suggest that some combinations are essentially toxic, while others provide at 
least a reasonable chance of success. The implication is that further systematic coding 
and analysis of change theories, action theories, and in particular their combinations 
in programs could produce useful insights for both evaluation and public-policy 
decision making. 
Keywords: action theory, implementation, program theory, public policy, theory of 
change 
Résumé : Une revue rapide des résultats d’évaluation dans presque n’importe quel 
domaine révèlerait que la majorité des études abordent l’implantation des interven-
tions (théorie de l’action). De plus, les résultats d’analyse d’implantation indiquent 
fréquemment un manque de correspondance entre le type ou le niveau de mise en 
œuvre et la nature fondamentale de l’intervention. L’analyse de quelques cas indique 
que même s’il est impossible d’évaluer toutes les permutations et les combinaisons 
de théories de l’action et de changement, il est possible d’utiliser ces cas pour tirer 
certaines leçons qui suggèrent que certaines combinaisons sont essentiellement, 
toxiques, alors que d’autres indiquent une chance raisonnable de réussir. Une codi-
fication et une analyse systématiques plus poussées des théories du changement, 
des théories de l’action, et de leur combinaison peut conduire à des observations 
utiles autant pour l’évaluation que pour la prise de décision en matière de politiques 
publiques. 
Mots clés : théorie de l’action, implantation, théorie d’intervention, politiques pub-
liques, théorie du changement 
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Theories of change and program theories have been much discussed (as they 
are in this special edition); however, what has not been focused on lately are the 
key differences between what has been called the theory of change and the action 
or implementation theory. According to Rogers (2014), a “theory of change” es­
sentially explains how activities are understood to produce a series of results that 
contribute to intended impacts. Chen, Pan, Morosanu, and Turner (2018) have 
recently gone on to distinguish the theory of change and the action theory quite 
definitively. They note that the change model describes the causal process gener­
ated by the program and distinguish the action model from the change model as a 
“systematic plan for arranging staff, resources, settings and support organizations, 
to reach a target group and deliver intervention services” (p. 54). The Treasury 
Board of Canada Secretariat (TBS) (2010) has noted that such theories should 
include assumptions, risks, and external factors that describe how and why a 
program is intended to work. The TBS goes on to say that theory connects “the 
program’s” activities with its goals. It is inherent in the program design and is often 
based on knowledge and experience of the program, research, evaluations, best 
practices, and lessons learned. I contend that the problem with the TBS’s state­
ment is that it appears to conflate “theory of change” (i.e., an explanation of how 
and why a certain type of intervention will make a difference) with the action or 
implementation theory. As noted above, action (some have called it implementa­
tion) theory has been distinguished from change theory by Chen (2005, p. 23), 
who states that action theory 
specifies the major activities a program needs to carry out, ensuring an environment 
for the program that is supportive or at least not hostile, recruiting and enrolling 
appropriate target group members to receive an intervention, hiring and training 
program staff, structuring modes of service delivery, designing an organization to 
coordinate efforts, and so on. 
As an extension of Chen’s comments, see also Sager and Andereggen (2012), 
Mayne and Stern (2013), Montague and Porteous (2013), Renger, Bartel, and 
Foltysova (2013), and the six distinguishing elements of an action model (Chen 
et al., 2018). Indeed, Chen’s program-theory models typically show reasonably 
elaborate action theories. 
The problem is that many modern logic models, and certainly those found 
in Canadian studies, suffer from the conflation of these ideas, as shown in the 
TBS definition above. They either do not show the “action theory” at all or they 
“blend” in the key elements of Chen’s action theory.1 What results from this 
conflation is a framing for analysis that may not anticipate design, delivery, or 
implementation weaknesses that relate to how a program is implemented—as 
compared to weaknesses that are a result of problems or gaps in the change 
theory. Note that, in Chen’s model, more conceptual space is dedicated to the 
Action Model than to the Change Model and yet in most logic models, it is the 
other way around. 
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An illustrAtive exAmple of the issue 
In order to illustrate this point, an example is in order. Consider an education 
or training program. The theory of change follows Kirkpatrick and Kirkpatrick’s 
(1994) learning theory, which states that there are four levels of change connect­
ing what Funnell and Rogers (2011) categorize as an individual-based theory of 
reasoned action: 
1.	 Reaction: what participants thought and felt about the training; 
2.	 Learning: the resulting increase in knowledge and/or skills, and change 
in attitudes; 
3.	 Behaviour: transfer of knowledge, skills, and/or attitudes from class­
room to the job (change in job behaviour due to training program); 
and 
4.	 Results (some evaluators might call these ultimate outcomes or im­
pacts): the final results that occurred because of attendance and par­
ticipation in a training program and due to the behavioural changes 
that ensued after the training (these are benefits and can be monetary, 
large-scale performance-based, etc.; they typically connect to mission 
goals). 
(For an example of such a theory with assumptions, please see Koleros and Mayne 
in this special issue.) A typical logic model or theory of change description might 
simply show inputs and activities and outputs leading to the above-noted expected 
change. The problem here is that even if a broad range of assumptions and con­
textual factors are considered, when mapped simply to the change-theory logic 
they may only peripherally relate to the soundness of the design and delivery of 
the training. 
Many times in evaluations of training, the design and delivery of training are 
seen as critical to its success. The mode, medium, content, timing, and physical 
conditions surrounding the training are critical. How often have we seen that 
training offered to people has suffered from poorly designed materials, learning 
environments, timing, or tailoring (relevance and suitable format), or from deliv­
ery problems with those teaching, relationships between teachers and students, or 
linkages to supportive infrastructure, institutions, or individuals? How often have 
we seen a failure to reach the appropriate students in the first place? Such elements 
and assumptions are rarely included in theory of change depictions and logic 
models, yet experienced educational evaluators (and empirical evidence) suggest 
that delivery and design components can make a huge difference to the success 
of educational investments. The quality of teaching is particularly important; see, 
for example, Chetty, Friedman, and Rockoff (2014), whose statistical study sug­
gests that teacher quality is associated with huge differences in student outcomes. 
Lesson learned #1: For educational programs (theories of change), pay atten­
tion to the pedagogy and the quality of the teaching. 
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the preponderAnce of the problem 
A quick perusal of recent evaluation findings shows that observations of de­
sign and delivery (action or implementation theory) elements are more com­
mon than observations regarding the theory of change. A quick review using 
Google of available online evaluation reports notes that items such as delivery 
timeliness, collaborative support, data and information sharing, the delivery of 
funding, and the clarity of roles and responsibilities were found to be prevalent. 
These components are all related to the manner in which a program is delivered, 
rather than focusing on its anticipated results. In summary, some of the learn­
ing in evaluation reports relates to how programs/initiatives are delivered, yet 
most logic models and frameworks are either silent or give short shrift to the 
implementation (action) theory that serves the theory of change. Therefore, 
evaluation learning in perhaps its area of highest potential is unsystematic and 
almost accidental. 
Other articles in this issue explore “useful” models for complex settings, 
nested models, actor-based models, and methods of getting away from “mecha­
nistic” approaches to depicting theories. In this article I look at simplified case 
examples to illustrate the value in recasting activities, outputs, and outcomes by 
area in order to distinguish and recognize the theory of action or implementa­
tion (these words will be considered synonymous) as separate but related to the 
application of a theory of change (ToC) itself. These cases will broadly illustrate 
the application of this thinking at different levels and contexts, but they will also 
note “lessons learned” in order to show some immediate practical results from 
adopting such an approach. 
summAry cAses for considerAtion 
Case 1: “Cash for Clunkers” vs. infrastructure support as 
economic stimulus 
In the fall of 2008, policy analysts and economists debated what to do about that 
year’s recession. They accepted the need for large government stimulus packages, 
but their debates centred on where to put the money. Two types of stimulus pack­
ages that were often discussed in North America were major public works (infra­
structure) and tax “break” programs. Logically, the theories worked as follows: 
1.	 Public infrastructure: 
•	 invest	in	(needed)	infrastructure; 
•	 construction	and	“supply	community”	employment	will	be	directly	 
and indirectly created; 
•	 the	economy	will	be	stimulated	/	“saved”	/	maintained; 
•	 needed	public	infrastructure	will	be	put	in	place	in	place;	also	ena­
bling 
•	 supporting	goods	and	services	markets	to	be	maintained. 
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2. Tax break: 
•	 provide	a	tax	cut	to	taxpayers; 
•	 those	people	will	spend	more	money	in	the	economy;	and 
•	 the	economy	will	be	stimulated	/	“saved”	/	maintained. 
While not all economists agreed, option (1) tended to be favoured over option 
(2), essentially because the idea was that public infrastructure investments left a 
legacy to help further growth (think “Marshall Plan” for war-ravaged Europe or 
Asia), while tax breaks could serve to more strongly exacerbate deficits: one-time 
infrastructure spending creates a “temporary” deficit and builds assets, compared 
to tax breaks, which could cause more permanent structural deficits, especially 
since tax cuts are politically hard to reverse. Economists also noted issues with 
distributive effects (tax cuts tend to favour those who pay more taxes, namely 
the wealthy) and problems of absorption. People might tend to save money since 
times were uncertain, so the stimulus would not work its way into markets as 
“fully” as other incentives. This latter concern appeared to come true, as Ameri­
can savings rates jumped to their highest levels in the decade right around this 
time, and the wealthiest Americans—the primary beneficiaries of the tax cuts of 
the early 2000s—are shown to have saved disproportionately more than lower-
income earners (Board of Governors of the U.S. Federal Reserve System, 2016). 
In the end, governments went mostly for infrastructure investments, with some 
“sweetening” of social programs; for example, in Canada the employment insur­
ance requirements were adjusted. 
So what happened? Tim Kiladze (2010) of the Globe and Mail noted that in­
vestors were far too optimistic about the extent to which public stimulus funding 
to infrastructure would boost the fortunes and bottom lines of the construction 
industry (and the economy). Kiladze quoted a market analyst as follows: 
Very few meaningful stimulus related infrastructure projects were launched in 2009. 
In fact, somewhat ironically, some infrastructure spending was actually delayed ... as 
[provincial, state, and local] governments awaited funding from the federal stimulus 
coffers. 
By contrast with the above, and assuming that some stimulus was needed to boost 
the economy, one of the few Canadian federal government programs that argu­
ably seems to have worked well—perhaps almost too well—in terms of spending 
money quickly was euphemistically called “Cash for Clunkers” (Elliot, 2009). 
The Canadian equivalent, “Retire Your Ride,” was essentially a rebate program 
to support people trading in their gas-guzzling, polluting older vehicles for more 
fuel-efficient, newer vehicles. The national program was in a way like a tax cut, 
but one-time, temporary, and based on a specific activity. It took off, meeting 
its annual targets of retiring 50,000 vehicles each year once the full program 
had been launched. Its evaluation noted that the program would have met its 
vehicle-retirement target of 200,000 in 48 months if it had not been delayed in its 
implementation by 21 months (Environment Canada, 2011). A large number of 
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figure 1: A simplified logic flow for infrastructure spending of a central gov-
ernment in a federal system. 
those “retirements” were achieved in 2009, which, according to reports, provided 
a significant boost to automobile sales, possibly acting as a key push to reinvigor­
ate the automobile sector (Elliot). At a minimum, sales were accelerated during a 
time when spending stimulus was needed. Why was this kind of program able to 
work while the best-laid “grand design” programs for infrastructure fail? The an­
swer lies most likely not in the (mostly macro-)economic theory of one stimulus 
type versus another once in place; instead, it arguably lies in the implementation 
network or pathway of reach and relationships that these different initiatives 
require. Let us reconsider the infrastructure results pathway, including the reach 
and relationships “implementation” logic (see Figure 1). 
Figure 1 shows that the reach, roles, and relationships for the delivery of typi­
cal infrastructure investments are myriad, complex, and politically dynamic. This 
means that, for one thing, they tend to take time. The number of major capital 
infrastructure projects that have been completed on time and on budget (in North 
America at least) can practically be counted on one hand. The fact is that the struc­
ture of the roles, relationships, and authorities required to “action” the stimulus 
assistance, even when streamlined, works against speed in delivery. As noted by 
Kiladze (2010), the Government of Canada infrastructure program announced 
in 2008, but delivered late, likely had the perverse effect of “de-stimulating” the 
economy by delaying otherwise shovel-ready investments. By contrast, the key 
reach, relationships, and results for “Cash for Clunkers”-like programs are much 
more direct (see Figure 2). 
Lesson learned #2: Infrastructure support programs in multi-jurisdictional 
settings tend to make for slower than expected stimulus funding. 
Clearly, other levels of government, members of civil society, mass media, 
and citizens can still affect the relationship between the government provider and 
the user, but this relationship is still much more direct and “authoritative” than a 
program to create public infrastructure. In other words, government “A”—in this 
case the U.S. or Canadian government—has an unambiguous authority to offer 
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figure 2: Simplified logic flow for “Cash for Clunkers” (“Retire Your Ride”) 
citizens an incentive (a “carrot” or “bribe”) to trade in their vehicles for new ones. 
In most infrastructure investments, there are several jurisdictions and dozens of 
competing interests in play. 
Lesson learned #3: Stimulus delivery speed = F(# +complexity of authorities, 
the number of key actors, transaction amount, relationship (strength, trust), 
technical complexity, and other factors). 
The main point is that public policy makers need to examine the reach, 
relationships, and roles implied by particular schemes when deciding on a given 
course of action. This is especially true when the initiative is required within 
a tight time frame for stimulus spending. Infrastructure investments may be a 
“good” investment in terms of economic theory, but as quick stimuli they are 
often structurally handicapped. The implementation reality does not typically fit 
the theory of change in this case. 
Case 2: Repayable contributions for high-technology innovation 
Another way to look at implementation and change theory “fit” is to describe 
them along with their requisite assumptions and then review evidence. Table 1 
summarizes a brief review of repayable contributions for innovation programs. 
The reviews used here involve more than a dozen studies, either conducted or re­
viewed by the author, of different types of innovation programs run over the past 
four decades by the Government of Canada. Some programs included repayability 
clauses and consortium or partnered delivery, while some did not. All related to 
some level of innovation commercialization as at least one intermediate outcome. 
Three theories are identified in Table 1: theory of need or theory of the problem, 
theory of change, and theory of implementation/action. For more on problem 
identification and analysis discussion, see the United Nations Development Pro­
gramme (2009, pp. 39–43). 
Lesson learned #4: Proceed with extreme caution regarding the inclusion 
of repayability clauses in innovation funding agreements if you are dealing 
with projects that are a fair way from commercializing, but also if repayment 
triggers have widely interpretable definitions of success and consortium 
recipients have access to highly competent lawyers and accountants. 
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table 1: Summary of findings from past innovation contribution program 
reviews 
Theory Reality observed 
Problem theory (cause–effect): Investment in sector X becoming increasingly 
There is insufficient innova- multinational ... not clear that domestic invest-
tion in sector X caused by 
a lack of domestic invest-
ment gap hinders innovation but rather gap in 
international investor confidence plus other policy, 
ment to bring innovations to standards and marketplace barriers. 
market. 
Change theory (how a Cash does appear to enable many proponents to 
contribution mechanism move forward faster in many cases than they would 
should work) otherwise; however, if negotiations and payments 
A contribution will provide 
needed cash to companies 
to reduce their burden and 
go too slowly, then the lack of certainty creates risk 
aversion and may discourage highly innovative and 
less predictable investments in favour of stable and 
costs so as to encourage 
them (or allow them) to move 
“safe” investments proposed by proponents. (See 
repayability below.) 
innovations from discovery to 
commercialization. 
Implementation (Action) “Repayability” clauses were found to work against 
Theory: the need for nimble investment, since consortia are 
Repayability in the contribu-
tion will address WTO con-
often involved and repayment liability is handled 
by lawyers and accountants. (Intellectual property 
cerns about unfair support. 
It will also ensure greater 
discipline in the innovations 
to focus on getting product 
to market. 
disputes among consortium members and the 
Government of Canada were also raised as barriers.) 
This “delay” and increased uncertainty create a 
negative feedback loop, which leads to a slow, hard 
process, which in turn leads to negative reactions, 
which lead to fewer good applicants and projects. 
In any case, when repayment has been contingent 
on commercial success, most funded innovation 
programs in Canada have had a very modest repay-
ment rate. It seems that the payment triggers can 
be quite easily avoided—especially by large and 
more sophisticated contribution recipients. 
Department will partner Associations were not always found to represent 
with the sector X industry all important sector interests—causing internal 
association in order to select political disputes and lack of trust in the process, 
and deliver projects—based reducing reach and slowing processes, reinforcing 
on the premise that the sector a negative feedback loop, leading to fewer good 
industry association will know applicants, which led to less success in areas of 
and represent the needs of newer development (i.e., less innovative innovation 
the sector for innovation. projects may get funded because of a bias toward 
the more developed interests of larger players who 
carry greater weight in associations and partnered 
program management initiatives and who create “a 
success to the successful”2 feedback loop.) 
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Case 3: Administrative Monetary Penalties (AMPs) 
We can also review the use of theory regarding needs or problem areas, change 
theory, and implementation/action theory in the area of regulatory control mecha­
nisms. The idea of an Administrative Monetary Penalty (AMP) has a long history 
and connects to a deterrence pyramid “theory” stemming from Australian coal 
mining over many decades. An enforcement pyramid subjects regulated firms to 
escalating forms of regulatory intervention. These typically escalate from persua­
sion, a warning letter, civil penalty, criminal penalty, licence suspension, and then 
licence revocation (Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992). Table 2 summarizes the theory of the 
need or problem, the theory of change and the theory of action / implementation. 
table 2: Summary of findings from past AMPs review 
Theory Reality observed 
Problem Theory 
Regulators need an ability 
to moderate an otherwise 
harsh response (i.e., too big 
a jump between warning 
and criminal penalty). 
Regulators have inefficient 
existing means available 
(i.e., need to improve 
efficiency in regulation). 
Change Theory (how a 
monetary penalty sanction 
will work) 
A civil commercial penalty 
(the Administrative 
Monetary Penalty—AMP) 
is needed to fill out the 
deterrence pyramid and to 
allow for scaled deterrence. 
Not all regulators need a civil sanction, and not all civil 
penalties fit easily into the “scaled” pyramid. 
AMPs often do not work as planned due to both theory 
being misapplied to context and implementation 
factors. The AMPs mechanism (as a theory of change) 
works where there exist 
•	 a	high	level	of	regulated	party	commitment	to	the	 
basic intent of the Act (low level of willful non-
compliance); 
•	 controlled	inspection	conditions; 
•	 low	complexity	in	terms	of	regulatory	clauses	and	 
transactions; 
•	 a	significant	proportion	of	commercial	transaction	 
“value” represented by the AMP—the economics of 
the marketplace; 
•	 a	belief	on	the	part	of	the	regulated	party	that	 
enforcement actions will be upheld; and 
•	 a	complementary	naming	and	shaming	mechanism	 
is in place (i.e., charged names are published)— 
good for established companies with a potential for 
reputational loss. 
(Continued) 
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table 2: (Continued) 
Theory	 Reality observed 
Implementation (Action) 
Theory 
Agencies will readily apply 
AMPs to gain efficiencies 
in sanctioning violators 
and will improve the cost-
effectiveness of the whole 
system. 
There can be significant cultural differences between 
and among implementing parties which significantly 
impact AMPs’ efficiency and effectiveness. 
The key stakeholders include: 
•	 associations	(supplier	and	consumer) 
•	 policy	makers	and	program	proponents 
•	 inspectors 
•	 enforcement	officers 
•	 legal	counsel 
•	 “review”	institutions 
Other key implementation factors include: 
•	 clarity	of	language	defining	violations 
•	 knowledge	by	inspectors	and	investigators	of	what	 
constitutes a violation 
•	 “commitment”	to	the	promotion	of	regulatory	 
compliance by inspectors and regulators 
•	 level	of	engagement	with	regulated	parties—and	 
their representatives 
•	 consistency	of	the	interpretation	of	legal	respon-
sibilities and authorities of all concerned parties and 
burden of proof / sufficiency of evidence 
The main findings summarized here are from an evaluation study conducted 
for the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) in 2011. This study undertook 
an in-depth review of theory available in the literature before examining the use 
of AMPs at CFIA. 
Lesson learned #5: AMPs fit much better for some types of applications (i.e., 
straightforward, high volume, inadvertent breech, strong supporting community) 
than for others. In addition, the implementation/action characteristics required 
for AMPs to work require a real commitment to deterrence by inspectors, infor­
mation sharing practices, and clear/easy to interpret authorities. 
WhAt the evAluAtion teAm tried 
In cases 2 and 3 above, a systematic approach was used in real evaluation studies 
to come up with the findings noted in Tables 1 and 2. In summary, the study team 
i) extracted the implementation theory from a conventional logic model; 
ii) lined it up with the change theory; 
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iii) drew from research, experience, and analysis key assumptions and ena­
bling factors to examine what factors were important and how they 
connected; and 
iv) tested the “lined-up” theories with real case evidence. 
The study team, led by the author, constructed models to test key stages of sig­
nificant cases for evidence of how key factors influenced performance and to 
test possible alternative explanations for results. The teams found that case-by­
case assessment allowed study teams to pinpoint evidence to attempt to validate 
contribution claims and then help explain key factors for success. This altered 
depiction enabled the teams to identify issues regarding funding structure, 
governance, activities flow, and sector engagement/participation, which could 
be shown to directly influence the nature of the change theory, behavioural 
results, and impacts. More importantly, the dialogue allowed all concerned to 
separate issues, observations, and “learning” related to program governance 
and implementation from concerns related to a broader theory of change. In 
other words, the approach likely helped avoid a rush to judgement regarding 
the merits of an overall approach to regulation or innovation by noting that the 
characteristics of the implementation design and delivery had a profound effect 
on how the change theory worked. Therefore, if one reads between the lines in 
the 2011 AMPs evaluation, the study is not saying that AMPs don’t work; it is 
saying that this instrument works better in some applications than others, due 
to some key enabling conditions. 
The laying out of a results chain showing how implementation (action) theory 
conditions change theory helps to establish the true (complicated and/or com­
plex) reality of a program. It can also help all stakeholders to understand that 
change occurs in and among different groups. Such an insight in turn suggests 
that there is merit in planning initiatives with different expected results chains for 
different groups (see the article by Koleros and Mayne in this special edition for 
one approach that illustrates this concept). 
proposed ApproAch 
So analysts like Chen (2005) and realist evaluators like Pawson and Tilley (1997), 
Funnel and Rogers (2011), and most recently Brousselle and Buregeya (2018) 
have distinguished action/implementation from change theory. Brousselle and 
Buregeya suggest that logical analysis, contribution analysis, and realist evaluation 
have a grounding in critical realism and that we may be observing a fifth genera­
tion of evaluation. If so, it will require models that are intuitively accessible to a 
wide range of users; that is, the models can’t get too complicated. It is hoped that 
the cases presented above show the practical value (lessons learned) from thinking 
about how each component works, and most importantly how each component 
works with (or against) the other in terms of how implementation (design and 
delivery) arrangements match up with theories of change. 
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As noted, traditional logic models do not extensively describe theory of any 
kind, let alone both theory of change and theory of action/implementation. At-
tempts to include both can be “unwieldy,” to say the least. So what does an evalu-
ator do? Need one rely on narratives and side descriptions to adjust conventional 
logic models? Can a comprehensible approach be undertaken? Over the past five 
years, along with other evaluation colleagues, I have developed an approach to 
systematically and sequentially consider the action/implementation theory and 
the change theory. This approach is summarized in Figure 3. 
The first step is to recognize the action/implementation logic or theory that 
is involved. The process evaluation questions related to “how” a program is deliv-
ered are relevant, along with governance questions, attributes, and so on that may 
be drawn for program-authorizing documentation and reviews such as internal 
audits. The next step is to establish the theory of change that accompanies the 
program. There may be more than one. For example, there may be an educational 
component, suggesting a theory such as Kirkpatrick and Kirkpatrick’s (1994) 
learning model, as well as a financial contribution designed to reduce cost bur-
den and/or encourage particular behaviour (a “carrot” program). There may be 
some kind of potential penalty or sanction for those not ultimately complying (a 
“stick” program). Each of these theories should be “modelled” as applicable (see 
Bemelmans-Videc, Rist, & Vedung, 2011). 
Research can next be done on the theories to determine which factors have 
been important in shaping success. In addition, it will be important to look for 
figure 3: Theories of implementation (action) and change, key assump-
tions and factors. Montague, S. First used in 2015. Using Realistic Contribu-
tion Analysis for Process and Impact Evaluations, CES Annual Learning Event, 
February 25, 2015 
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studies and analyses of how the proposed implementation strategy has worked in 
combination with the stated change theory. Figures 4 and 5 show the results of 
such an analysis: one regulatory application and one innovation support program. 
The importance of this approach is that it can provide insights with only 
minimal original data collection and can guide data collection so as to invest 
gradually, in a targeted fashion and as needed, to support evaluation questions. 
This can potentially save thousands of dollars in data collection. If, for example, 
early parts of the results logic show that the implementation strategy is not reach-
ing the target users, then one need not proceed much further with an analysis of 
impact on that target group. 
In each of the examples shown, the insights had different emphases, but they 
also had some common elements. In the implementation of financial stimulus via 
infrastructure investments (as opposed to direct cash rebates for trading in one’s 
vehicle), the broader enabling environment would seem to play the fundamental 
role in determining success. Very little can be done about the federal system that 
exists in the United States and Canada, and these systems are in fact structured, re-
spectively, by design and by evolution in order to temper the will of one government 
figure 4: Regulatory initiative results chain for contribution analysis: Sum-
mary of AMP observations. CFIA. (2012). Evaluation of Administrative Mon-
etary Penalities (AMPs). http://inspection.gc.ca/about-the-cfia/accountability/ 
other-activities/audits-reviews-and-evaluations/evaluation-of-amps/amps/ 
eng/1337024520304/1337025417391 
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over others. This structural condition of the political economy—including the vast 
geography of both countries—would seem to create what amounts to a fundamental 
barrier to conducting large-scale centrally directed infrastructure projects in a short 
time frame, assuming that these liberal democracies stay in place as they are. In 
Canada, infrastructure in the form of a national railway system was at once a source 
of the nation’s emergence and the cause of its first major scandal. The interesting 
thing about the building of the Canadian transcontinental railway is that, accord-
ing to Pierre Berton (1970, 1971), the construction element of the railway was done 
quickly and, despite some deplorable treatment of immigrant workers, efficiently. 
The main issues were political—with regional politics dominating from the outset. 
In this case the “implementation” theory writ large relates to the characteristics of 
the political system in place, its distribution of authorities, and therefore its compli-
cated authorizing environment. (See also Mark Moore’s (1995) Strategic Triangle, in 
which he describes the “value proposition”—akin to the theory of change, “opera-
tional and resourcing considerations,” and “authorizing environment.” 
In the second case of repayable contributions for innovation, the use of a 
theoretically appropriate condition (i.e., repayability), appealing to both those 
concerned with politics and those interested in economics, does not work in 
practical application because of both the behavioural effects such a clause trig-
gers and the uncertainty it brings. In the case of one of the innovation programs I 
figure 5: CTS results chain factors and assumptions. Natural Resources 
Canada. (2013). Evaluation of Clean Transportation Systems Portfolio. https:// 
www.nrcan.gc.ca/evaluation/reports/2013/14844#3_2 
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reviewed, agreements and payments were taking many months, causing concern 
and indeed hardship to all but the most patient and well-capitalized investors. The 
conclusions of this evaluation include the following: 
In an era of Federal Government deficit reduction, TPC has been asked to cover a 
myriad of industrial policy objectives. The program was given a wide reaching man­
date to create jobs and foster innovation in three very different sectors. At the same 
time, TPC’s role in the innovation assistance process was limited by the focus on re­
quirements for investment payback, as well as being subjected to intense international 
scrutiny. These constraints have led to several logical inconsistencies in its set-up, as 
compared to previous and other existing contribution programs: 
•	 The	program	focuses	on	repayment	of	investments,	yet	it	must	fund	(increas­
ingly since the WTO decision of 1998) high risk technology innovation—often 
in emerging areas of technology. 
•	 TPC	must	operate	in	a	consistent,	transparent	and	“fiscally	responsible”	manner,	 
leading to a lengthy multi-step assistance process, yet it is by definition mandated 
to fund projects of high technology risk and market uncertainty—areas which 
require speed and flexibility. 
•	 The	program	was	 essentially	developed	 in	many	 respects	 as	 a	 “son	of	DIPP.”	 
The Defence Industries Productivity Program (DIPP) was designed to serve the 
needs of the mature, cold-war aerospace and defence industry of the 1970s and 
1980s. The approach is likely not consistent with a program being asked to assist 
sectors (even that of the modern aerospace industry) facing a completely differ­
ent market situation. 
In conclusion, TPC has, in theory and rhetoric, been established to serve several 
publicly stated industrial innovation goals and sectors, while subjecting itself to the 
constraints of economic development assistance in the modern era. In reality it would 
appear that the “one-size fits all” approach that has been taken up to now may not be 
up to the task. (Industry Canada, 2003, pp. 5–6) 
Regrettably, while innovation programming has evolved away from a “plodding” 
risk-averse delivery culture, it has not, at this time, moved all that far. This perhaps 
speaks as much to the Canadian government’s weakness in systematically accu­
mulating evaluative evidence and knowledge as it does to a failure to distinguish 
the implementation factors important to program success. (The theme of knowl­
edge accumulation through better and more consistent theory-based evaluation 
is a theme expressed elsewhere in this special issue.) 
In the third case, a regulatory instrument—AMPs—is first situated in its 
theoretical place in terms of regulatory instruments (i.e., on a continuum between 
warnings and criminal prosecutions) and then examined for its fit with respect 
to the logical expectations for the theory. In essence, the theory fails in certain 
application areas (i.e., low-value cargo, difficult inspection conditions, multiple 
groups involved in processes, the lack of basic “will” to comply in the target and 
surrounding communities, and technical testing difficulties) and has certain im­
plementation considerations and constraints (i.e., motivations of inspecting staff, 
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vaguely worded guidance in terms of legal or regulatory clauses, limited penalty 
levels versus cargo values, and the presence or absence of complementary deter­
rents or incentives, including a “sympathetic” quasi-judicial and judicial appeals 
system). When these and possibly some other conditions are negative, AMPs are 
doomed to fail. This was found for applications under the Health of Animals Act 
and regulations of the CFIA, but several of these conditions were also found to 
be true in other cases outside of food safety. The CFIA’s (2011) Evaluation of Ad-
ministrative Monetary Penalties summarized the factors guiding use in terms of 
evidence from the research and evidence from interviews as follows: 
Scholars have noted that AMPs are appropriate when the following elements are 
present, and their observations are supported by the interviews conducted for this 
evaluation: 
•	 a	large	volume	of	cases	is	likely	to	be	processed	annually	(that	is,	many	transac­
tions are being inspected); 
•	 the	regulator	had	stronger	sanctions	but	the	monetary	penalties	could	be	used	 
to moderate a harsher response; 
•	 speedy	adjudication	to	the	enforcement	scheme	is	important; 
•	 specialized	knowledge	(for	example,	technical	expertise)	and	agency	expertise	 
in the resolution of disputed issues was needed; 
•	 issues	of	law	are	rare; 
•	 consistency	of	outcome	was	important;	and 
•	 there	is	a	likelihood	that	an	agency	or	group	of	agencies	will	establish	an	impar­
tial forum in which cases can be efficiently and fairly decided. 
Interviewees made the following suggestions of key factors affecting AMPs success: 
•	 The	regulated	party	has	a	high	level	of	commitment	to	the	basic	intent	of	the	 
legislation, so there is a low level of willful non-compliance. For example, asso­
ciations and companies are willing to work with the CFIA to ensure compliance; 
•	 The	regulations	contain	clear	language	defining	violations; 
•	 There	are	controlled	inspection	conditions.	For	example,	the	inspection	takes	place	 
in a regulated public facility vs. a remote privately run location; 
•	 Transactions	are	not	complex; 
•	 Inspectors	 and	 investigators	 share	 an	 understanding	 of	 what	 constitutes	 a	 
violation; 
•	 Inspectors	and	all	other	regulator[y]	program	staff	share	a	commitment	to	the	 
promotion of regulatory compliance; 
•	 There	is	a	consistent	interpretation	of	the	legal	responsibilities	of	all	concerned	 
parties, and of the burden of proof and of evidence; 
•	 Significant	proportion	of	commercial	transaction	“value”	represented	by	AMP	 
(i.e., the cost of the AMP versus the value of the shipment); and, 
•	 Regulated	parties	believe	that	enforcement	actions	will	be	upheld. 
In this case, sorting these observations after the fact into implementa­
tion and theory of change factors can be useful, because in general terms, 
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implementation elements (penalty levels, regulation clarity, inspection and 
appeals process changes, communications and internal education investments) 
urge one to consider how to do things right. On the other hand, the broader fac­
tors related to the target areas and the basic fit of the deterrence theory suggest 
how to do the right thing (e.g., if we are dealing with chronic non-compliers who 
see the AMP as a cost of doing business and have a business model that essen­
tially relies on “borderline” practices, then it will likely take more than AMPs 
to be successful in bringing them into compliance). In the case of the latter— 
complementing AMPs with the publishing of the names of AMP recipients 
(naming and shaming) subsequently worked for at least one chronic offender, 
according to direct correspondence between a CFIA official and the author (see 
Pawson, 2006, for an elaboration of factors allowing the use of naming and 
shaming to work). 
So while each of the cases briefly examined here looks at different levels of policy, 
programming, and instrument use, has different levels of observable evidence, and 
appears to relate to slightly different definitions of implementing or action theory—if 
not both action/implementation and change theory—these cases also have some­
thing in common. All three cases suggest that sorting or synthesizing a policy, pro­
gram, or initiative by its change theory and its implementation/action theory can be 
beneficial in understanding why and how phenomena occur. Ultimately, the practice 
should be helpful in accumulating knowledge and evaluative evidence. 
conclusions And implicAtions 
Canadian evaluators appear to have led a worldwide trend to develop what Brous­
selle and Buregeya (2018) have called a fifth generation of theory-based evalu­
ation. This generation combines theory-based approaches to determine logical 
consistency and likely impact (logical analysis, contribution analysis) with ex­
planatory features surrounding program mechanisms (realist evaluation). They 
see a coalescing of approaches using critical realism as a foundation to focus on 
“the explanatory power of contextual characteristics, implementation processes, 
and causal pathways to show, by identifying expected effects and impacts, how 
an intervention’s activities and outputs lead to outcomes” (p. 64). This paper sug­
gests that in order to continue to foster this trend, which has evolved somewhat 
unconsciously up to now, it is useful to more clearly codify implementation/ 
action theories and change theories, and furthermore to consider them together 
whenever one looks at a policy, program, or project intervention. Brouselle and 
Buregeya also suggest that we may be witnessing the evolution of a composite 
approach that follows the logic of a given intervention: 
As the intervention unfolds, several implicit causal mechanisms result in the cumula­
tive success or failure of the entire intervention or some of its components. Theory 
based approaches to evaluation are used to shed light on these mechanisms that oper­
ate in open systems and are embedded in multiple social systems. (p. 164) 
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This paper briefly models just such an approach and attempts to integrate theory-
based approaches in order not only to make an attempt to show logical connec­
tions and contributions but also to help explain how and why certain results occur 
through specified contextual considerations applied at different parts of the results 
chain or impact pathway. Thus the whole may be greater than the sum of its parts 
in terms of explanation. 
There would seem to be a major opportunity in the future to continue to consist­
ently codify both implementation/action theories and designs and change theories. 
This accumulated knowledge and learning could focus on what works, to what extent, 
for whom, and why, under specific application conditions—including the implementa­
tion characteristics, the change theory characteristics, and the combination of the two. 
I have suggested a few practical lessons learned from such efforts. Imagine an open-
access learning system that might collectively put forward such learning for review, 
challenge, embellishment, and refinement. Such a practice might finally embed evalu­
ative thinking into public management—perhaps in a kind of global Socratic forum 
where “learnings” such as those sprinkled throughout this paper can be discussed. 
At the very least, we as evaluators might systematically address Patton’s (2018) 
ninth principle of evaluative thinking: “Evaluative thinking looks at the connec­
tions between processes and outcomes, and that means distinguishing them and 
measuring both” (p. 23). I have proposed a small addendum to this principle— 
namely, that evaluative thinking should also systematically look at the fundamen­
tal “fit” of implementation processes with desired outcomes. 
notes 
1. This practice may have been a result of a lack of familiarity with the Chen model, but 
also the somewhat complicated depictions and language used in its communications 
such that many practitioners do not see the difference between the action or implemen­
tation theory and the essential change theory. 
2. “Success to the successful” is a famous archetype in systems thinking. See, for example, 
Senge (1994); Kim (2018). 
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